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Extending the theory of generational accounts, I show that the conventional
current account is not related to the real effects of a country's fiscal policy. For
any international array of fiscal policies, a country can implement its own policy
so that the conventional government and current account deficits are zero in
every period. I argue that economists should develop a new measure of the
current account. This measure is forward looking and keeps track of expected
transfers between countries.

1.

INTRODUCTION

This paper uses a technique first developed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and
then generalized by Kelly (1991) to show that a country can implement its fiscal
policy in a way that satisfies any exogenously imposed constraint on the path of the
current account. Using the model of overlapping generations, Kelly establishes a
quite general result: taxes can always be timed so that an economy's budget deficit
satisfies an arbitrary constraint even though fiscal policy has real effects for every
agent in every period. 2 I extend this work in two directions: first by demonstrating
that this intuition is true for the open economy; and second by showing that it
carries naturally into stochastic environments.
Although this paper has a theoretical focus, its implications for empirical
economists and policy makers are profound. The result below is not a theoretical
curiosum; it gets at the essence of what economists ought to measure when they
compile current account statistics. Just as a conventional corporate balance sheet is
misleading if unfunded liabilities are not reported, the conventional current account
is misleading when expected net transfers to abroad have changed. For example,
when the United States shut down Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the
Philippines in the months after the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, there was a change
in the stream of expected net transfers to abroad. A conservative estimate of the

1 I thank two anonymous referees for very helpful comments and Karl Shell for conversations
that shaped profoundly my ideas on this subject. I am also grateful to Alan Viard, Jim Peck, Mario
Crucini, and seminar participants at the State University of New York at Albany, Syracuse
University, the Ohio State University, the 1994 summer meetings of the Econometric Society at
Quebec, the Australian National University, La Trobe University, Auckland University, the New
Zealand Treasury, and Otago University for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any
remaining errors are my own.
2 In a simple model, McCandless with Wallace (1991, p. 88) showed that allocations in an
equilibrium with government bonds can also be supported in an equilibrium with lump-sum taxes
and transfers in which the government debt is zero in each period.

present value of this change is 20 billion dollars. This is an increase in the United
States' net foreign assets, and it should be reflected in the properly defined current
account for 1992. 3
Dewald and Ulan (1990) have made a similar point. They argue that the
conventional measure of the current account is misleading largely because it uses
historical, not market, values of net foreign assets. I extend this insight by emphasiz
ing that a correct measure of changes in net foreign assets ought to incorporate all
foreseeable net transfers to abroad. It is likely that the market value of net foreign
assets reflects accurately expected future private payments to abroad. But there is
no conventional measure that captures expected unilateral public transfers to
abroad. 4
One implication of my work is that "balance-of-payments disequilibria" need not
be related to a country's government deficit as usually measured. Hence, it may not
be meaningful to make international lending conditional upon "structural adjust
ments" that decrease conventional measures of aggregate demand. 5 Such recom
mendations may be misguided, and policy makers ought to use generational ac
counts to measure the effects of fiscal policy. On this point, Auerbach, Gokhale, and
Kotlikoff (1991) are quite right.
Of course, a country's external deficit is the sum of its private and public net
borrowing. This tautology is often used to argue that the external deficit places some
constraints on fiscal policy. Howard (1989) gives the conventional wisdom: he
describes policies that reduce a country's loss of net foreign assets when the
expected profile of the trade balance may not be "sustainable." A sustainable profile
for a country's external deficit depends, however, upon the fiscal policies of all the
countries in the world economy, as I have emphasized elsewhere (1990). Since there
is no simple relationship between the conventional government deficit and the real
effects of fiscal policy, a deterioration on the conventional current account may not
necessitate a decrease in the conventional government deficit.
The right way of thinking about the relationship between the internal and
external deficits is to use generational accounts. In the open economy, what matters
is a measure of the present value of net transfers from abroad. Again, this measure
depends upon the fiscal policies of all countries in the world economy, and it need
not be zero in any period. In the penultimate section of this paper, I argue that the
aggregate generational current account, the annual change in the expected present
value of net transfers from abroad, is an appropriate measure of the external deficit.

3 The statistical discrepancy in the United States' current account deficit was roughly 12 billion in
that year.
4 For example, increased expected military aid from abroad in the wake of the Gulf War should
be reflected as an Egyptian "foreign asset" on a meaningful measure of the external account for
Egypt in 1991.
5 The idea that there is a link between the conventionally measured government deficit and the
external deficit is tenacious in the minds of policy makers. Williamson (1983), for example, describes
the International Monetary Fund's perception of how its policies influence countries' external
deficits and public sector borrowing requirements.

If the aggregate generational current account worsens, then some domestic resident
will suffer lower utility. This simple fact is not true of the conventional current
account.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
its equilibrium. Section 3 shows that the conventional current account is not
meaningful. A meaningful alternative is proposed in Section 4: the aggregate
generational current account. Section 5 is a brief conclusion emphasizing some of
the practical implications of my arguments and putting forth an agenda for empirical
work.
2.

THE MODEL AND ITS EQUILIBRIUM

The model extends the seminal work of Balasko and Shell (1980 and 1981) by
allowing for several agents in each generation and several different assets, 6 and it
incorporates uncertainty by adopting the framework of Manuelli and Peck (1990). In
order to keep the theoretical exposition succinct, the model is presented in a very
cursory manner.
The set of agents born at time t is Go and the index set of the agents in the world
economy is G = U~=oGs' Agents live for two periods;? thus, the set of agents
trading at time t z 1 is G t - 1 U G t . A list of countries is a partition of G; there are
HZ different countries. Hence, if :if = {Gl, ... , G//l'} is a partition of G, then h E Gj n
G t is a resident of country j born at time t.
I consider a stochastic exchange economy with /' perishable goods available in
each period. The endowments of agent h E G t are
Wh =

(0, ... ,0,

wh, wh+ 1 ,0, ... ),

where wfz E ~~ is the vector of goods the agent has at his disposal at time t. 8 I
make no assumptions about the location of wI; i, the ith good available to agent h in
period t; hence, an agent can be endowed with nontraded goods and traded goods
located in other countries.
The state of the economy at time t is

where

()t

includes random variables other than the agents' endowments. I assume

6 These assets are stores of value that bear state-contingent interest, and they are used to
implement countries' fiscal policies. The reader should think of them as government bonds
denominated in different currencies.
7 This assumption is not at all restrictive; see Balasko, Cass, and Shell (1980) for an algorithm
that converts any truly dynamic economy with arbitrary demographics into the one described here.
8 Note that agent h E Go is endowed with goods only during the (first and) last period of his life.
Also, the assumption that an agent may not be endowed with positive amounts of each good is more
general that that in Balasko and Shell (1980 and 1981) because I assume the existence of an
equilibrium in the discussion below.

that s t E S, a compact state space. For most of what follows, one can take ()t to be
constant, but I include it to allow the possibility of extrinsic uncertainty. Following
Manuelli and Peck, I assume that {s t}~= 1 is a Markov process with transition
probability P(s, A), describing the probability that St+1 EA ~ S, given that St = S E S.
I assume that this stochastic process has a unique invariant measure A.
A history at time °t is a list of realizations of this process,

The agents in period t know this history before they make their consumption and
asset choices, and the description of goods and asset prices are sequences of random
variables.
Agent h E G t has preferences that are represented by an expected utility function
defined on the goods that are available to him in the different histories that he
might face. His expected utility is summarized by E{u h(xfl(Sf),
x~+ 1(St+ 1 ))}, where expectations are taken with respect to the history st. Hence each
agent's state-contingent allocation is a sequence of (measurable) functions

where both xfz(st)E ~~ and Xfl+ 1(Sf+1)E ~~. The list of goods prices in the world
economy is an analog<?us sequence,

where pt(st) E ~~. This notation emphasizes that prices depend upon the history of
the world economy. I use the normalization that p 1, 1(s 1) = 1 for all histories s 1.
Hence, these functions are state-contingent present value prices, and
pt,i(st)jp t+1, i(St+1) is the ith commodity's realized "own-rate of interest" between
periods t and t + 1.
Agents receive lump-sum tax transfers in the HZ different fiat assets in the world
economy. The vector of transfers to h E G t is

where now both m~/st) E ~nt and m~z+1(st+1) E ~//l. If m~j(st) < 0, then agent h is
taxed in currency j after history st. Likewise, an agent receives a subsidy from
country j after history st if m~j(st) > O.
The sequence of asset demands of h E G t is

h E G t acquires net additions of (saves) type j assets in the first period of his life.
The present prices of the HZ assets are

where qt(st) E ~~ is the vector of fiat assets prices after history st.
Since agents in the same generation make choices under uncertainty, there will be
a market for state-contingent contracts in each period. I assume that such a market
opens after these agents are born and offers a security paying a constant income in
each state in the next period. The demand of h E G t for this Arrow security is
Zh = (O, ... ,O,zh(st),zfz+ 1(st+1)'O, ... ),

where zh(st)

E ~.

The sequence of prices of this security is

where ,t+1(St+1) = ,t+1 for all realizations St+1.
I can now state the consumer's problem succinctly. Given history st, agent h E G t
chooses xh(st), Yh(st), and zh(st) and also chooses Xfz+1(St+1)' Yh+ 1(St+1)' and
Zh+ 1 (St+ 1) for each St+ 1 to solve 9

(1)

maximize

subJect

E{ u h ( xfz( st), Xh+ 1(St+ I))}

t~

(i) p·x h +q·Yh +r·z/z ~P·wh +q·m/z;
(ii) xfz(st) ~ 0, Xfl+ 1 (St+ 1) ~ 0;
(iii) yfz(st) + yfz+ 1 (St+ 1) ~ 0; and
(iv) zfz(st) + zfz+ 1 (St+ 1) ~ o.
In other words, he maximizes expected utility conditional on the history st. Note
that these constraints hold for every realization St+ 1; hence, (i) expresses compactly
as many constraints as there are states of nature in period t + 1. Constraint (i) states
that the consumer maximizes expected utility subject to a present-value budget
constraint, and its inner products are well defined because only finitely many of the
elements of x h' Yh' Zh' W h, and m h are not zero. Constraint (ii) states that agents
may not short any commodity, and (iii) states that no agent may die a net debtor in
any of the HZ currencies. It is important to emphasize that (iii) allows an agent to
borrow and lend in any currency in order to smooth consumption during the course
of his life. Finally, constraint (iv) states that the agent may not create an Arrow
security that he does not redeem.
9

The problem for h EGo is quite simple since he faces no uncertainty.

Let Yil describe the cumulative fiat asset holdings of agent h
is given explicitly by
Yh

=

(0, ... , 0, y ~ ( S t) , y ~ ( S t)

each of whose elements is in

~ /7l-.

E

G t • This sequence

+ Y/1 + 1 ( St + 1 ) , 0, ... ),

Consider also

Mt(st) =

L, L,

m7z(sk),

k=l hEG

the HZ -dimensional vector representing the sum of all injections of the different
currencies that have occurred up to time t. Then

is a profile of national debts for all

HZ

countries. Also, let

be this agent's stock of the Arrow security.
A rational expectations equilibrium is a sequence of goods and asset prices and a
corresponding list of allocations and asset demands that are all functions of the
history of the economy. Thus, for history st and realization St+ l ' a rational
expectations equilibrium consists of
and

(2)
such that

(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

(x/z' Yh'

Zh)

solves (1);

LhEGxh~LhEGwh;

LIl
LIl

E
E

GYh
CZh

~ M;

~ 0.

and

10

Condition (D states that allocat~ons and asset demands are chosen to maximize each
agent's expected utility subject to the natural constraint after any history. Condition
(ii) is that of material balances; 11 it is an infinite-dimensional vector inequality each
of whose elements keeps track of one dated commodity. This inequality is well
defined because there are only finitely many agents in the world economy at anyone
time. Condition (iii) shows how the stocks of the HZ different asset markets clear; it
I stipulate that y~ = 0 E [R/?t and z~ = 0 for all h EGo'
If there are nontraded goods in the /7/ different countries, then (ii) is necessary but not
sufficient. One must further stipulate that the demands and supplies for such goods involve only
subsets of the agents. Then the extra condition is Liz E GjXfz'i(st).:::; Liz E GjWfz'i(st) for each commod
ity (t, i) that is a nontraded good in country j after history st.
10

11

too is an infinite-dimensional vector inequality. The right side of (iii) describes the
evolution of the stock of HZ different outside assets; hence (iii) is the analog of (ii),
although one condition expresses an equilibrium in stocks of assets and the other an
equilibrium in the flow of commodities. Constraint (iv) is analogous, although here
one sees that the net supply of Arrow securities is zero after any history.
The next section shows why a country's current account is a poor measure of the
real effects of its fiscal policy. Holding fixed the expected utility of each of the
agents in the world economy after any history, a country always has a fiscal policy
that satisfies any given constraints on its current account and government deficit.
Since such an equilibrium supports arbitrary transfers of resources between coun
tries and between generations, the conventional measure of the current account
does not capture the real effects of governments' policies.

3.

WHY THE CONVENTIONAL CURRENT ACCOUNT IS A POOR MEASURE
OF THE EXTERNAL DEFICIT

Until now, I have been very general about the specification of each country's
policy of lump-sum tax transfers. Assume now that only country j can levy taxes or
subsidies using asset j; indeed, it is difficult to imagine another definition of a
country in a model this general. Assume also that Gj n G t =1= 0 for each t z 0; in
other words, each country has at least one person born in each period. Again, it
would be hard to imagine a country whose population died off and then started up
again.
The present-value of country j's conventional current account iS 12

(3)

bt,j(st)=pt.[ L.(Wh-Xfl)]
hEGJ

Equation (3) is a description of the conventional current account because the first
term in square brackets allows agents to have endowments located anywhere in the
world. If h E Gj owns commodity (t, i) located abroad, then pt,i(st)wh,i(st) is the
present-value of the flow of earnings accruing to ownership of that foreign real
asset. The conventional current account consists of three elements. The first is the
balance on goods and services, the second is net factor payments, and the third is
net transfers from abroad. Since this model is general enough to allow for the
domestic ownership of goods located abroad, the first term in brackets in (3)
captures both the balance on goods and services and the analog of net factor
payments from abroad. The last two terms in brackets in (3) are the present value of
12 For notational convenience, I have suppressed in (3) the dependence of prices and quantities
on the history st.

net transfers from abroad, and they are subject to the same ambiguity as annual tax
collections in the domestic economy.13
The profile of the present value of the current account of country j is

A history-dependent constraint on country j's current account is

where b j = {3j (i.e., bt,j(st) = (3t,j(st) for any st). This general formulation allows
many specific interpretations. It can express the constraint that country j's current
account is balanced in every period, that the present value of the current account be
balanced after every business cycle, or that the asymptotic present value of country
j's net foreign assets be zero. A constraint on a country's current account might be
imposed, for example, by an international lending institution.
I will denote currency-j transfers to h E G t by the sequence
m hj --

(0 , ... , 0 ,milt, j( s t) ,mht + 1, j( St+l'
) 0 , . . .).

Then a fiscal policy for country j is the list

where the definition of mf~ makes explicit that one's transfers depend upon the
history of the world economy up until his dotage. Although there is no role for
purchasing public goods or imposing distorting taxes in this economy, this limitation
is not serious because a country's fiscal policy is really the pattern of financing its
public expenditures. Hence a description of how a country's taxes fall on each of the
individuals in the world economy is the fullest possible specification of its fiscal
policy.
I can now state my result.
13 A large part of unilateral transfers consist of grants to other foreign governments. During the
last two decades, the United States' net transfer payments to foreign governments have been roughly
four times as large as net transfer payments to foreign individuals. This poses a technical problem in
a model of overlapping generations since one keeps track of transfers from governments to
economic agents. This difficulty is overcome by induding finitely-lived "administrations" in the list
of agents in the world economy. These administrations have no endowments, and their utility
functions are constant on the space of commodity bundles. Hence, they have no effect on the
material balances condition describing equilibrium. Then the two theorems proved below have the
added interpretation that countries can implement their fiscal policies so that the present value of
their transfers to foreign administrations remain unchanged when the current account satisfies an
arbitrary profile.

THEOREM. Consider a rational expectations equilibrium consistent with some array
of fiscal policies. Let {3j be a constraint on country j's current account. If currency j is
valued after any history, then country j has a fiscal policy satisfying this constraint, and
this policy has no effect on the utility of any agent in the world economy after any history.
PROOF.

See the Appendix.

The proof of the theorem constructs a fiscal policy that works in a simple way.
After any history SI, the government of country j picks some foreigner in generation
1 and delays transfers (or borrows from abroad in the first period). It promises him
sufficiently large future transfers (with state-contingent interest) so that his con
sumption plans are unchanged for any realization of S2. Hence, prices and quanti
ties are unchanged after any history s 1 and for any realization s 2. 14 The government
of country j uses a clever swap of liabilities and assets towards foreigners that has
no real effect on any agent and makes the current account as "healthy" as necessary.
Then it repeats this process with a new foreigner in the next period. The proof uses
the assumption that currency j be valued after any history. But this is the least that
one can hope for if an international agency is going to impose an arbitrary
state-contingent profile on the current account.
Inspection of equation (3) shows that transfers from country j to its own residents
do not affect the current account if the goods and services balance is unchanged.
Hence, the government of country j even has a policy tool left over to satisfy any
constraint on its own budget deficit: it can time transfers to its own residents in
order to satisfy any constraint on its internal deficit! In other words, all of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff's (1987) profound objections to the conventional measure of the
government budget deficit are still true in the open economy. In fact, only transfers
that increase the wealth of generations currently alive can cause a deficit on the
balance on goods and services. Hence generational deficits, not conventional deficits,
influence the trade account, and there is no simple relationship between a country's
generational deficits and its conventional current account because different agents
have different marginal propensities to consume from increases in permanent
income. 1S
Since a perfect foresight equilibrium is a special case of a rational expectations
equilibrium, the theorem is an important generalization of the results of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) and Kelly (1991). These authors had the right intuition:
conventional macroeconomic statistics that include transfers among agents have no
immediate foundation in utility theory. This conclusion is quite robust, and
economists should be cautious about how we interpret some conventional macroeco
nomic statistics.
It is important to make clear what the theorem does and does not say. A rational
expectations equilibrium describes implicitly the utility of each agent in the world

14 Such a policy is akin to Charnley and Polemarchakis' (1984) notion of an open-market
operation using a "real" asset.
15 Many econometric analyses have found only weak evidence that budget deficits affect the
conventional current account. See Evans (1990) for a good discussion.

economy after any history. Consider this description as fixed. Then the theorem
states that country j has a fiscal policy satisfying any constraint on its external
balances, and this policy still supports these utilities. The theorem does not state the
selection of a particular equilibrium is independent of what country j does. If agents
use information about the timing of a country's deficit as a way of selecting
equilibria, then that deficit does matter. In other words, constraints on the current
account need not matter, but they may not be entirely irrelevant either.
The conventional measure of the current account is relevant to the extent that
people condition their choices on it. If people think a large conventional deficit
indicates that country j is undergoing a balance-of-payments crisis, then their
actions may well influence the equilibrium in the world economy. But the theorem
states that country j always has a fiscal policy that will allow it to run a balanced
conventional current account even when agents presume that there is a putative
crisis on the external accounts.
Another implication of the theorem is that two identical conventional current
accounts may have quite different real economic effects. 16 Unilateral transfers to
abroad have different real economic effects, depending upon the marginal propensi
ties to consume and import of the foreigners receiving the transfers. International
economists have long had the intuition that external deficits used to finance
domestic investment are somehow different from thQse that are used to increase
domestic consumption. This intuition is quite correct, and I will come back to it in
the next section.

4.

A MEANINGFUL MEASURE OF THE EXTERNAL DEFICIT

The theorem shows that the conventional current account is just not a meaningful
measure of a country's external deficit. What is a good measure of this deficit? I
propose a measure called the aggregate generational current account. Decreases in the
aggregate generational current account indicate that some domestic agent will
experience decreased utility after some history. This is a sound utility-theoretic
foundation for a proper measure of the external deficit.
Defining the aggregate generational current account will require a bit more
notation. Let I~ be the index set of goods in the endowment of agent h that are
located in country j, and define the sequence

. (0

,., )

if (t, i) $ I~

-

Wh -

t i

w1z'

otherwise.

The present value of the foreign assets of h

16

E

Gt

n Gj

An anonymous referee helped me emphasize this point.

are

where I have been careful to include both real assets and transfers from foreign
governments in this definition. The present value at time t of the expectation of all
current and future net foreign assets of country j is

pt,j(st)

=E(

I:

L

k=t-l hEGknGj

f,,(Sk,Sk+d -

L

L

[pow~ +qom{,]),

k=t-l hEGk\GJ

where the expectation is taken after history st.l? This expression summarizes the
expected value of both real and financial foreign assets. The first term in the
brackets represents current and future transfers from abroad to the residents of
country j, and the second term in the brackets is the expected present value of
transfer from country j to abroad. The aggregate generational current account at time
t is

(4)
where the first implicit expectation is taken after history st and the second is taken
after st-l. This measure capture the annual change in the expected present value of
a country's net foreign assets broadly defined.
Fisher and Woo (1994) have constructed an aggregate generational current
account using data from the post-war Korean economy. Calculating its historical
values entails two big steps. First, one measures current net foreign assets in each
year at market value. Second, for each year, one makes a projection of the present
value of all net transfers from abroad, based upon information that was known at
that time. 18 Then one sums the present values derived in these two steps and takes
first differences. Calculating forecasts of the aggregate generational current account
entails making explicit assumptions about exchange rates, interest rates, the market
value of net foreign assets, and expected net transfers from abroad.
The aggregate generational current account given in (4) has many appealing
properties. First, temporary changes in exchange rates, the market value of net
foreign assets, or interest rates have only a minor effect on this measure. On the
other hand, a permanent depreciation causes an immediate improvement in the
aggregate generational current account. Just as the inflation tax decreases
the real liabilities of the central government, so does a depreciation make net
transfers to abroad· less onerous. Hence, a permanent depreciation increases the
utility of some domestic resident. 19
Note that fh(St-l, St) = fh(St) for h E G t - 1.
For a country with large foreign military commitments, this projection ought to be based on all
publicly available information about future foreign policy; for a country with a sizable fraction of its
labor force employed abroad, this projection should include the demographics of the work force and
its expected future remittances from abroad.
19 This aspect of the aggregate generational current account implies that much of the literature in
international economics on the J-curve arises because the external deficit is measured inappropri
ately.
17
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Also, a permanent increase in the market value of a country's net foreign assets
increases its aggregate generational current account, and current and future genera
tions can anticipate higher utility arising from a greater stream of payments from
abroad. Further, a permanent increase in real interest rates improves the aggregate
generational current account of a debtor country since it lowers the present value of
expected payments to abroad. Finally, re-scheduling sovereign debt, so characteristic
of the developing country "debt crisis" in the last decade, has no effect on the
aggregate generational current account unless it affects the expected stream of
payments between countries. 20
The aggregate generational current account also allows one to differentiate
between external deficits arising from consumption binges and those arising from
increases in permanent income. Think of a country that has experienced an increase
in expected net foreign assets, perhaps owing to a technological discovery making all
of its generations better off. Such a country might quite naturally import in
anticipation of higher future income. This activity appears as a deficit on the
conventional current account, whereas the aggregate generational current account
would quite rightly show a surplus. On the other hand, a country whose government
runs generational deficits that are financed by foreigners must consider not only the
conventional current account deficit but also the present value of expected pay
ments to abroad. Of course, the aggregate generational current account captures
these expected payments.

5.

CONCLUSION

I have made a theoretical point in this paper: the conventional measure of the
current account is not an economically meaningful concept. This fact is true for
growing economies and for equilibria that do not satisfy an inter-temporal efficiency
criterion. 21 Indeed, it is a robust property of equilibrium in dynamic models. This
result has been well known for the budget deficit in the closed economy, and it has
spurred some important research on appropriate measures of fiscal policy. This line
of research has important implications for the open economy, and it casts doubts on
whether the current definitions of "structural adjustments" make sense.
The aggregate generational current account is easier to construct than Auerbach,
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff's generational accounts because one need not keep track of
20 There is little evidence that re-scheduling changed the market value of the North American
banks who held much of this debt; see Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) for an event study. After having
defined the aggregate generational current account, I am inclined to believe that the developing
country "debt crisis" in the 1980's was much ado about nothing. Still, in the last decade, the United
States government developed an inter-agency task force to assess the repayment capabilities of the
major sovereign debtors, and the Bank of International Settlements created an "early warning
system" to keep track of the aggregate exposure of commercial banks in the major industrial
countries to sovereign debt. Both these institutions are apposite if expected payments from abroad
are what matters in measuring a country's external accounts.
21 Nothing in the arguments above assumed that there was a uniform upper bound on the
conventional current account, government deficit, or the present value of endowments. In other
words, we never assumed that the "interest rate" was greater than the "growth rate" of any
macroeconomic variable.

net official transfers to abroad for each generation. Instead, the nature of external
accounts is such that one is interested in the sum across generations of these
transfers. But, in another sense, my measure is a challenge to the empirical work on
generational accounts. Since this work has been accomplished for the closed
economy, it has assumed implicitly that the present value of net transfers from
abroad is zero. There is no theoretical justification for this assumption in the model
of overlapping generations, and there is little empirical support for it in the long
time series on the present values of net foreign assets of several major industrial
countries. While recognizing that the empirical work on generational accounts has
been extremely valuable to date, I hope that the measure I have proposed will spur
further empirical research in this area.

The Ohio State University, U.S.A.
APPENDIX

PROOF OF THE THEOREM. Let m j be the fiscal policy of country j, and fix all
other countries' policies. Let the constraint on the current account of country j be
f3j. I will construct a new fiscal policy fhJ that leaves unchanged the present value of
the wealth of every agent in the world economy and satisfies b t,jest) = f3 t, jest) after
any history.
First, for any history s 1, let m kj(s I) = m kj(s I) for each h EGo' Second, for any
realization s 2' let

for all but one agent

hI E

mk/(sl)

=

G I n (G\ GJ). For this agent, let

L

f31,j(SI)j q l,j(SI) -

mkj(sl).

hE (GoUG 1)\{h 1}

Then choose mh'/(s2) so that

where again mh'/(s2) is given by the policy m j . Note that I have not changed the
present value of the wealth of any agent h E Go U G I after any history S2.
Let PA be the distribution induced by A on the product space n~= I St. Since A is
the unique invariant measure, this new fiscal policy does not affect PA• Hence, asset
demands and allocations satisfy the equilibrium conditions (2) for the case where
t = 1. Thus the first term on the right side of (3) is unchanged, and bl,j(SI) = f31,j(SI).
Assume mj has been constructed for the agents in Go U ... U G t . Let
mt+2,j(s
))}
{( mt+l,j(st+l)
h
'h
t+2
hEG t + 1

=

{(mt+l,j(st+l) m t +2,j(s
h

'h

t+2

))}

hEG t + 1

for all but one agent h t + 1
m~1~+11,j(st+1)

E

G t + 1 n (G\ GJ). For this agent, let

= f3 t + 1 ,j(st+1 )/qt+1,j(st+1)

-

L

m~1+1,j(st+1).

hE (GtUG t+l )\{h t +1 }

Then choose m~1+2,
j(St+2) so that
t+l
)
m t + 2, j ( S
h t +1
t+2

=

m t + 2, j ( S
) h t +1
t+2

[q t + 1 , j ( S t + 1 ) /q t + 2, j ( S

t+2

)] m t + 1 , j ( S t + 1 )
h t +1
'

j
where again m~1+2,
j(St+2) is given by the policy m . Again, I have not changed the
t+l
present value of the wealth of any agent h E Go U ... U G t + 1 after any history
st+2, P
is unchanged, asset demands satisfy (2), and b t + 1, j(st+ 1) = f3 t+ 1, j(st+ 1)
A
after any history.
The proof then proceeds by induction.
D
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